Turning The Tide Or Last Ditch Effort? – Ukrainian Offensive in Kursk Region
The sudden Ukrainian Offensive in the Kursk Region took many by surprise. For the first time during the Russo-Ukrainian War, it was Kyiv who took the initiative and took the war onto Russian soil. Ukrainian mechanized brigades managed to crush the unorganized defenses established by Russian Border Guards, loose army units, and the FSB and penetrate, capturing significant areas, including the town of Sudzha. But despite the psychological effect and now as Russia mounts its first significant counter attack has anything been achieved by the Ukrainian invasion of Russia?
Before the Offensive…
The Ukrainian offensive comes at a difficult time of continued Russian attack attritional advances on Toretsk and Pokrovsk in the Donbas Region, Ukraine. Since the loss of Avdieevka and the temporary collapse of the front in this direction, Ukrainian troops had a very difficult time. Almost simultaneously Russian forces launched an attack in Kharkiv Region, tying down significant Ukrainian reserves. In July, the Russians managed to retake the settlement of Robotyne as well, thus nullifying any solid Ukrainian gains from the 2023 Summer Offensive.
Thus for months now the Ukrainian General Stuff has been in a difficult position. The Russian Army managed to gain some additional territory with their stepping offensive, suffering high casualties in equipment and personnel, but draining materiel and blood from the Ukrainians as well. With a lack of initiative on any front, little reserves, and lacking freedom of movement the Ukrainian Army bogged down in defensive battles, trading ground for more Western support and Russian losses.
In early 2024, the Ukrainian General Staff suspicions about a possible full-scale offensive that Russia was preparing for the summer. According to some high-ranking officers the Russians were to preparing as many as 100,000 soldiers and heavy equipment for the strike. However, as of late August, this threat has not materialized in any form. Instead, Russia has continued its pattern of attritional advances on multiple fronts, forcing Ukraine to spread its manpower thinly.
After two years of combat, Ukrain’s available manpower has shrunk significantly. In April President Zelensky pushed for the lowering of the mobilization age and general overhaul of the mobilization system. This step allowed Kyiv to think about increasing Ukrainian reserves and issuing recruits to the brigades which suffered dearly earlier in 2023 and 2024. With the addition of a huge aid packet approved by Congress in April 2024, things started to take at least a more optimistic look.
In the greater scheme of things, the Ukrainian Army had to keep through this difficult moment and continue the fight in the most exposed directions.
Syrskyi’s Gamble
With the conditions set over the battlefield, Ukrainian General Staff had to think outside of the box to recover from the failed Summer Offensive last year, which led to the loss of much of the modern equipment bringing very little gains. With the forces stretched out in Donbas and Zaporzhia and little operational reserves, something decisive yet unexpected had to be organized. It seems that the decision to attack the Kursk Region was the best solution at hand.
For months the Ukrainian Armed Forces were scouting the region with the use of various UAVs and reconnaissance groups which penetrated the border deep into the Russian territory. The lack of resistance and solid defensive lines was most likely recognized pretty quickly and the idea to exploit Russian weaknesses was born. However, the Ukrainian officials decided to keep this idea to themselves for fear of opposition and of potential leaks of plans played a key role in this lack of communication with its Western partners.
At the beginning of August, the Ukrainians proceeded with, what seemed at the time like just another small incursion into the Kursk region. However, the deployment of major armored assets at a scale much larger than previous cross-border raids pointed to something more significant as Ukrainian forces penetrated much deeper into Russian territory than in the past. This full-scale offensive made use of long-range artillery, anti-air cover, and FPV drone air support which played a vital role in the breakthrough. Within days Ukrainian armored columns pushed any token resistance aside and penetrated dozens of kilometers from the state border and were approaching the town of Sudzha and pushing north-east towards Kursk.
The Russian Armed Forces were caught by surprise and quickly reoriented the majority of air operations against the newly created bulge in the frontline. They dropped guided munitions against Ukrainians with limited effect on the first stages of the offensive. ZSU managed to secure its flanks on the Sejm River and other watercourses by destroying bridges and isolating the battlefield.
In those first stages of the offensive many prisoners were taken while the political leadership in Moscow faced shock and disbelief in Ukrainian actions.
In the first three weeks, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to secure over 100 settlements and villages and keep their gains firmly, denying Russians any possibility of reclaiming Sudzha anytime soon. The quick advance met with little resistance in the first stages left Russia with new issues to solve before the public but also on the frontline. Yet, looking at the Kursk offensive it is difficult to ascertain what its purpose was and whether any significant successes were achieved.
The Picture We Get
So what has been happening throughout August in regards to the Ukrainian offensive? The opinions are not consistent and it is very difficult to understand the concept and aims behind Syrski’s plan. On one hand, Ukraine gained political leverage on Russia and forced the West to accept the use of gifted weapon systems on targets inside Russian territory. They also captured significant numbers of Russian personnel and brought the war home to Russian territory like never before, perhaps creating some psychological impact with the Russian people at large. However, the strategic and tactical objectives of the incursion remain questionable.
The Ukrainian situation in the Donbas remains extremely difficult, near critical at this point, with no major reserves being able to react in case of a potential breakthrough in the Toretsk direction. In recent days Ukrainian Army lost Novohorodivka and will possibly have to face a Russian attack on Pokrovsk in September. In this regard, the Kursk Offensive brings almost nothing to the table.
President Zelensky, however, sees things differently. In an interview on 27 August, he mentioned a four-part plan for Ukrainian victory which he will present to US officials during his diplomatic visit in September. The Kursk Offensive is mentioned as an important piece of this plan. Thus within the political domain, Syrski’s plan achieved limited benefits which may turn into gains after the upcoming US Presidential Election this year.
The situation on the ground, however, something different. The offensive has reached its peak and stalled with little progress in the last two to three weeks. The Russians continue their air operations against the bulge and in addition to attacking in multiple places on the entire Donbas front they have also launched a counter attack on the left flank of Ukraine’s positions in Kursk.
Conclusion
The Ukrainian offensive is neither a solution to all its issues nor insignificant to the entirety of war. Optimism has been tempered as the Ukrainian advance stalled and Russia has begun to stage meaningful counter-attacks. Ukrainian forces face multiple issues along the vast frontline and the situation in some places can be openly described as on the brink of catastrophe. The regional success in Kursk seems unlikely to transform into a turning point in this conflict – at least on the battlefield.
Yet one must remember that the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to surprise the Russians at the tactical level and have some degree of flexibility and surprise still at hand. They have certainly given Russia’s political leadership an unpleasant surprise, bringing the war home to Russian soil, but after all – is that truly enough justification for the exploitation of vital strategic reserves?